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Feelings of gender originate from many other sources besides family 
relationships and experiences of body and sexuality, which will be the 
focus in my analysis in this book. Experiences stemming from educa-
tional institutions, peer culture and peer relations, and popular culture 
and media are all important, in addition to the general impact of demo-
graphic, economic, political and cultural trends. The different sources 
cannot be strictly empirically separated. As David Morgan puts it: ‘family 
life is never simply family life … it is always continuous with other areas 
of existence’ (Morgan 1999: 13). Such areas of existence will also float 
into my analysis when they appear through the lens I direct towards the 
family and bodily experiences. By describing them separately at first, they 
may be easier to discover when they make their presence felt in the lived 
lives of the three generations. Some of the societal conditions I highlight 
will be particular to Scandinavia or Norway; others will be conditions 
that are similar in other Western countries. However, the focus will be on 
the Scandinavian/Norwegian context with an emphasis on the twentieth 
century.
 Family Forms: Equality, Difference 
and Individual Rights
Processes of modernisation have changed gender relations in all European 
countries, but the north-western part of Europe had an historical advan-
tage due to a specific pre-industrial family and household formation 
that gave married women a relatively strong position. The north-western 
European marriage pattern was characterised by a high marriage age for 
both men and women, marriage by choice and independent housing for 
the married couple and their children (Sandvik 1999, also based on the 
British historian John Hajnal’s studies). In this family form, the married 
couple and the nuclear family constituted the centre, in contrast to the 
patriarchal control in extended households that were dominant in other 
agrarian societies. A consequence of the high marriage age and the many 
who remained single was that many young people, including young 
women, would work in other households to earn their living before mar-
riage. This gave access to a period of youth outside the direct control of 
their parents. Hence, the life conditions for young women and men were 
not so different, and when they married, they had both become adults 
and brought property and productive resources into the family (Solheim 
2012). However, it is also important to note that the types of work that 
were seen as specifically feminine had lower status than the masculine 
ones. Married woman did not have any legal capacity (in Norway not 
until 1888); it was the husband who legally represented the household 
and who had the right both to economic disposition of the joint property 
and to keep discipline in his family. The north-western European family 
model was definitely not an egalitarian one, it was based on both gender 
differentiation and gender hierarchy, but married woman had economic 
responsibility and could, depending on the circumstances, have a strong 
position and authority in the household.
The development of industrial capitalism during the nineteenth cen-
tury led to a change in the bourgeois family that split private and pub-
lic domains and redefined the family as a sphere of intimacy instead of 
production (Hagemann 1999). This ‘modern gender revolution’ (Solheim 
2012: 45) laid the foundation for the two-sphere model implying radical 
sex differences with regard to both tasks and assumed personal traits and 
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capacities. It represented a gradual change from economic partnership to 
a complementary gender order, where women lost influence regarding 
the family’s property. However, the old family model maintained a strong 
position in Norway, which in the nineteenth century only had a very lim-
ited and not very wealthy upper class. In spite of the gradual restructuring 
of the economy during the nineteenth century, the vast majority of people 
still lived off farming, fishing and forestry, and they continued to do so 
into the twentieth century. In this rural population—from where many 
of our informants in the oldest generation came—the traditional family 
model based on economic cooperation between the spouses continued 
without interruption (Melby 1999; Crompton et al. 2007). Small-scale 
farming was often combined with fishing and forestry, which meant that 
the men had to leave for longer or shorter periods. This also kept up the 
necessity and importance of women’s work and their co-responsibility for 
the family. Quite a substantial number of women were directly involved 
in economic activities by the end of the nineteenth century, especially 
those in the working classes, but also to an increasing extent in the grow-
ing middle classes where unmarried daughters often had to seek paid 
work, for instance, as teachers. Due to the many widowed women and 
huge emigration mainly of men to the USA before and after 1900, there 
were a high number of unmarried women. These women either stayed in 
their families helping out or worked to earn their own living.1 In addition, 
many married women took part in the enterprises of their husbands in 
addition to taking care of the home. In most bourgeois families it was also 
necessary that the wives took responsibility for the household, although 
they were assisted by domestic servants. Generally, then, Norwegian 
women continued to work in or outside of the family, including after the 
bourgeois gender revolution (Hagemann 1999).
Norway’s route to modernisation has some special traits. The coun-
try was part of Denmark until the end of the Napoleonic Wars and was 
then in a union with Sweden until 1905. This delayed industrialisation 
compared to Denmark and Sweden. Norway did not become a  modern 
1 In 1900 20 per cent of men and 30 per cent of women between 30 and 49 years of age were 
unmarried or widowed (Hagemann 1999).
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industrial society until after independence in 1905. By 1945 half of the 
population lived in the cities, whereas a third still worked in agriculture 
and fishing. At the same time it is also the case that Norway ratified its 
first constitution in 1814, which was one of the most radical, liberal and 
democratic in Europe at that time. Among other things, it established 
freedom of the press, the separation of legislative, juridical and executive 
power, and abolished the nobility in the country. During the nineteenth 
century’s union with Sweden, which mainly concerned foreign policy and 
defence, Norway gradually developed as a nation state. This meant that 
the emergence of the Norwegian state apparatus and the process of mod-
ernisation took place under fairly democratic conditions, at a time where 
most of the population could read and write, and under the impact of a 
blooming economy during most of the nineteenth century. In addition to 
a fairly homogenous population in terms of religion and ethnicity where a 
majority were independent farmers and fishers, and the lack of both royal 
power, nobility and a large or rich bourgeoisie, these traits laid a solid 
foundation for an egalitarian culture. This is also seen in the influential 
role of popular and social movements, agrarian enlightenment and an 
increase in the level of general education in the second half of the nine-
teenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries (Melby et al. 2008: 5). 
As a result, egalitarian values, self-determination and emphasis on social 
inclusion rather than differentiation along the boundaries of public and 
private became part of the Norwegian national culture. The same traits 
are, with minor differences, seen in all the other Nordic countries. As the 
Nordic historians Melby, Ravn and Wetterberg describe it: ‘The Nordic 
model is distinguished by individualism combined with state responsibil-
ity for the common welfare through social reform and intervention … a 
political culture in which it was a state responsibility to reform society, 
relying on the active participation of the citizens’ (Melby et al. 2008: 5).
The relatively egalitarian character of the Nordic societies and family 
structure, and the interaction between the state and civil society, may 
explain why the Nordic countries became engaged in policies of gen-
der equality earlier than other European countries:2 ‘The democratic 
2 Women gained the right to vote in 1906 in Finland, in 1913 in Norway, in 1915 in Denmark and 
Iceland, and in 1919 in Sweden.
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 integration of women in civil society was a hallmark of the Nordic polit-
ical culture, as much as women’s agency is one among several factors 
that explain this culture’ (Melby et al. 2008: 5). New marriage laws were 
adopted in all the Nordic countries during the first decades of the new 
century. Unlike legislation in the rest of Europe at this time, these laws 
recognised married women as individuals in their own right by grant-
ing them the right to take up gainful work without the consent of their 
husbands and by establishing economic equality in marriage. Husband 
and wife were made jointly responsible for family provision and were 
also established as independent, formally equal owners of their respective 
property. Melby et al. (2008: 8) argue that this could actually be seen 
as an early ‘modified dual breadwinner model’. However, it was also a 
model based on unquestioned ideas of gender differentiation, as women’s 
unpaid work in the family was equated in principle with men’s mainte-
nance by money. In this way the law bridged the economic partnership of 
the old family model and the new male earner/female carer family, based 
on the bourgeois family model. Tax legislation clearly encouraged the lat-
ter model and continued to do so in Norway until 1959. However, one 
might say that the emphasis was more on the principle of gender differen-
tiation than on a belief in gender difference (Melby et al. 2008: 1). What 
united the old and new family models was the focus on family functions 
more than on gender identities or naturalised gender norms. This again 
contributed to tension with the principle of equal rights.
The economic decline in the 1920s and 1930s and the difficult condi-
tions in the labour market that followed gave an advantage to the prin-
ciple of gender differentiation. The numbers of housewives increased in 
the inter-war period. The farmer women became fewer, more working- 
class women could afford to quit their job and middle-class women lost 
their domestic servants. In addition, women married at a younger age 
than before and had fewer children.3 Since there was still a high number 
3 Between 1900 and 1930, statistics show that 40 per cent of married women in Norway were 
registered as housewives. After 1930 it increased rapidly and in 1950 it was 53 per cent. The year 
1960 saw this figure peak before it started to decrease. These numbers also include farmer women 
and women who worked in family enterprises. Only 4–5 per cent of the married women were 
registered as having paid work in 1900 and in 1950. However, the statistics did not include part-
time work before 1920 (Melby 1999: 234, 270). Occasional small and informal jobs, which many 
women took to improve the family economy, are not registered either.
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of unmarried women until the 1930s, there were also many women in 
paid work. But the absolute majority of married women were housewives 
and could now spend more time on housework, which in this period was 
professionalised through research and information campaigns (Melby 
1999; Hagemann 2010). During the Second World War, Norway was 
occupied for five years by Germany. This meant that there was no general 
draft in those years and thus no need for women to step in for the men 
in factories and other workplaces as was the case in many other countries. 
The male earner/female carer family policy was continued in the first 
decades after the war where the Scandinavian countries saw almost two 
decades of social democratic majority governments. Due to the economic 
boom and the need for women’s labour outside the family, family policy 
in the late 1950s became engaged with the idea of ‘women’s two roles’ as 
mothers and workers, but from the 1960s this changed into an equality- 
oriented discourse about women’s right to ‘freedom of choice’ (Melby 
et al. 2008: 11). Thus, regarding the old tension between gender differen-
tiation and individual rights, the latter now gained ground. Melby argues 
that the historically short period of the ‘housewife era’ mainly functioned 
as a makeshift to curb the increasing conflict between the old values of 
collective moral and work and the new values of individualism, which by 
itself triggered further modernisation and individualisation—including 
undermining the gender order itself (Melby 1999: 230).
These features of the Nordic countries have fostered a specific blend of 
equality norms and individually based rights in contrast to family rights 
that have had a stronger position in other welfare states in Europe. The 
longstanding aim has been to make every individual, including married 
women, economically independent, something that has contributed to 
weaken both patriarchal and parental authority. The orientation towards 
egalitarianism and individual rights is seen with regard to children as 
well. Norms of child-centred upbringing and a view of the child as a 
self-contained individual came earlier in Scandinavia than anywhere 
else (Therborn 1993). Corporal physical punishment, for instance, was 
banned in Norwegian schools in 1936 and in the family in 1972, and 
state-provided sex education was introduced early (de Coninck-Smith 
2003). The Nordic countries were also the first to adopt individual legal 
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rights for children (Therborn 1993; de Coninck-Smith 2003).4 Generally 
speaking, Scandinavian children enjoyed a relatively anti-authoritarian 
upbringing from the early 1950s, a free and relatively child-centred 
school system and less gender-stereotyped discourses than was the case in 
other European countries and the USA (see, for instance, Breines 1992; 
Jamieson 1998; Lawler 2000; Brannen et al. 2004).
 Improved Living Standards, Social Security, 
Class and Education
As sons and daughters of workers, small farmers and fishers, often with 
many siblings in cramped quarters, almost all of our informants in the 
oldest generation described a childhood with material standards very far 
from what their grandchildren had come to consider an ordinary standard 
of living. They emphasised that they did not starve, but in their detailed 
memories—kept through more than half a century—of what they ate at 
the different meals of the day and often also the exact prices for everyday 
groceries, we can see a reflection of life circumstances where food and 
clothing and the money to buy them were not taken for granted. For 
this generation of working-class and rural children, sufficient food and 
clothing and parents striving to provide this equalled a good childhood. 
Mothers who became widows had to manage both household and work 
for money outside, as there was no social security at that point other than 
the socially degrading poor relief fund. Class differences were prominent, 
both economically and culturally. However, belonging to the middle class 
did not necessarily entail much economic security either. In cases where 
the father died early, the mother often had to take unskilled paid work 
out of pure necessity.
The twentieth century saw a rapid increase in living standards. During 
the first decades of the new century in Norway, the threat of mass pov-
erty was replaced by a basic social security (Kjeldstadli 1994: 96). The 
4 In Norway children born out of wedlock gained the right to inherit from the father and carry his 
name from 1915. The state also supplied economic support if the father of the child did not pay 
(Melby et al. 2008: 10).
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improved living conditions led to better public health. The height and 
weight of children went up, and class differences in children and young 
people’s physical growth and development gradually disappeared. Yet, 
income differences between the social classes increased until the Second 
World War. Norway was neutral during the First World War and was 
occupied during the Second World War.
Compared to what children in many other countries experienced, rela-
tively few Scandinavian children had absent fathers because of the wars 
or saw them injured or killed.5 The deep sense of loss and separation 
found in other countries in this generation of children (Chodorow 2000; 
Brannen 2015) is not present in the narratives of those of our informants 
who grew up during the war. More of the men than the women in our 
study took part in the resistance movement or remember dramatic epi-
sodes. The women mention their fear of German soldiers and especially 
the Gestapo, that things were closed down or taken over by the Nazis, 
that it was a boring time to be young and that there was a severe lack of 
food and clothing. During the German occupation, the development of 
the new welfare state that had started in the mid-1930s came to a halt. 
After the war all social institutions had to be rebuilt and many commodi-
ties were rationed into the 1950s.
As in the rest of Europe, there was a rapid increase in living standards 
from the 1950s, which was in the beginning still within norms of mod-
esty and savings in daily life. From 1950 to 1970, private consumption 
tripled and differences in income among various groups of people were 
greatly reduced (Lange 1998). The informants in the middle generation 
do not talk about the question of whether they had enough food when 
they describe the living conditions of their childhood, but remember the 
fashionable clothes they yearned for that could only be granted on special 
occasions like birthdays or Christmas. Tight economy is, however, not 
remembered as a permanent state. In this generation, everybody, except 
children of single or divorced mothers, recalls how much better off their 
family became during the 1960s and they have vivid recollections of how 
5 About 0.3 per cent of the Norwegian population lost their lives due to the Second World War. 
(www.arkivverket.no/arkivverket). This includes 738 of the 772 Norwegian Jews (adults and chil-
dren) who were deported—with the assistance of the Norwegian state administration—to German 
extermination camps during the war. Only 34 returned alive.
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new consumer goods continuously arrived in the family: electric cookers, 
washing machines, refrigerators, transistor radios, tape-recorders, TVs 
and finally even a car for dad! The stories are filled with details about 
when their families got these commodities compared with other families, 
but the later they are born, the less they talk about this. It had become 
the normal state of affairs.
Not only did private consumption go up as the middle generation 
came of age, but so too did state-provided public services like health 
care, education and care services for children, the ill, the disabled and the 
elderly. The Nordic welfare states were gradually developed from the mid- 
1930s. In Norway the first laws about unemployment benefits, paid sick 
leave and retirement benefits were introduced in the 1930s, in addition 
to work hour regulation, paid holiday and laws about worker protection. 
After the war, in the 1940s, came the child benefit for all families, the 
educational loan fund for students and cheap housing loans to buy apart-
ments in the new suburbs; in the 1950s full retirement schemes for all; 
and in the 1960s support for single mothers and disability benefits. The 
whole system of national security was fully established by 1970. Along 
with a progressive taxation system, this led to less poverty and social 
inequality in the Nordic societies than in other countries (Korpi 2000). 
This is also some of the background for class journeys of this period 
being experienced as less dramatic than in countries with larger class and 
income differences. The period from 1935 to 1970 has been described as 
a period dominated by social consensus in Norway, as a period of integra-
tion and gathering around common goals (Lange 1998). As one of our 
informants, born in 1947, said: ‘it was a period of economic boom, nobody 
was unemployed. It was just available, and everything just progressed’.
The new laws of social security and work security reshaped the frames 
for the oldest generation’s lives as adults, but it was the expanding edu-
cational system that became decisive for their children. Whereas many 
in the older generation had to quit school early or give up the further 
education they wanted for economic reasons or due to family obligations, 
access to schools became easier for the middle generation. Before 1936, 
children only had to attend school when they were between seven and 12 
years of age (although most stayed until their confirmation at 14), and 
children from rural areas only attended school every second day. From 
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1936, seven years of ordinary school became mandatory and in 1969 this 
was extended to nine years. High schools were built in rural areas too, and 
the state provided educational loans in combination with free access to 
universities and colleges with the aim of making it economically possible 
for students from poor families to also enter higher education. There was 
a strong political incentive for encouraging young people to get higher 
education, regardless of class and gender, as education was seen as the 
main tool to increase equality and justice and reduce class differences in 
the population. The number who graduated from high school in Norway 
increased from three per cent of the age cohort in 1930 to ten per cent 
in 1960 and 36 per cent in 1990 (academic track). Girls surpassed boys 
in frequency of high school graduation in 1975, and during the 1980s 
they also became the majority in higher education (Statistics Norway 
http://www.ssb.no/a/english/histstat/). Social reproduction through edu-
cation was somewhat reduced, but did not disappear. New intersections 
between gender and class were established: taking the educational track 
to social mobility became more common and successful for working- 
class girls than for working-class boys in the post-war generations. Before 
the 1960s, marriage was the most prevalent path to social mobility for 
all women, but with the expansion of the educational system and with 
girls on average achieving better in school than boys, this changed. The 
opportunities for girls in the educational system may partly be explained 
by the system’s degree of formalisation: if you do well on one level, you 
are invited to enter the next (Frønes 2001). This has not least been the 
case in the Nordic countries, where there have been few private schools 
or elite schools, and where higher education has been, and still is, free.
The encouragement of girls’ education also led to a new intersection 
between gender and generation in the post-war years: the Norwegian 
economist Kari Skrede (1999) writes that this period had one policy for 
the daughters and another for the mothers. The policy for the mothers 
was based firmly on the gendered provider/carer family model, while the 
policy for the daughters had as its goal the breaking down of all kinds of 
class and gender barriers through the system of education. This ‘policy 
for the daughters’ is also seen in the early reduction of the gender gap in 
higher education in the Nordic countries. Compared to other European 
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countries, the gender gaps in education among those born in the 1940 
are small (Korpi 2000: 137).
The youngest generation was born at a time when the national secu-
rity system had just been fully established. Continuing education after 
compulsory school has over the three generations changed from being a 
privilege of the few to being a matter of course and, finally, a necessity 
for young people who want to create a competitive CV. The youngest 
generation was born in the year when Norway voted against membership 
in the EU (1972), but their childhood and youth still coincided with 
increasing internationalisation, mediatisation and new communication 
technologies. However, when we interviewed them in 1991, the Internet 
and the GSM net for mobile phones had not yet been launched.
The youngest generation grew up with self-evident affluence. Even 
though there were different economic standards in different families, 
nobody mentions not getting the clothes they want because of a lack 
of money. However, some did have parents who were critical towards 
brand-label clothing. For this generation as young persons, class differ-
ences seem to be perceived mainly as incidental differences in taste of 
music, clothes and lifestyle. Instead of talking about poor people, this 
generation talks about ‘losers’. One middle-class informant from our 
sample described girls coming from the eastern suburbs of Oslo not as 
less privileged than herself, but as ‘very common, a lot of make-up, quit 
school after junior high’. But in the period when this generation came 
of age, income differences actually started to increase again in Norway. 
Trends of deregulation put pressure on the organisation of welfare state 
provisions, and the labour market became less stable and predictable. A 
recession took place in the late 1970s and marked the end of the stable 
political climate led by the social democratic party. Around the time we 
did our interviews in 1991, unemployment was relatively high, especially 
among young people.6
Norway found oil in 1969 and the state-owned oil industry made the 
country into one of the world’s richest during the following decades. This 
6 In 1992 there was about six per cent unemployment in total and about 13 per cent for 15–24-year-
olds (Statistics Norway). This led to an expansion of higher education, which encouraged more 
people in our youngest generation to choose this option.
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contributed to reducing the insecurity and inequality-promoting effects 
of the era of deregulation and economic crises, but not at the same pace 
as the growing social differences. Increasing competition in getting into 
the higher education, jobs, promotions and individualised salaries made 
life more stressful for young people compared with the previous decades. 
But in spite of increasing deregulations, privatisation and the popula-
tion becoming more heterogeneous due to increased migration, so far 
the national security system has not been seriously affected (Korpi 2000; 
Ellingsæter and Widerberg 2012).
 Gender Equality: Policy and Practice
In 1979 the law of gender equality was ratified in Norway. In the fol-
lowing two decades gender equality policies had high public priority. 
The increasing numbers of working mothers gave rise to new social chal-
lenges that needed a political solution. In addition, women’s low degree 
of participation in political life, their absence from high professional 
and managerial positions, and problems of equal pay and discrimination 
became increasingly visible and were perceived as incompatible with the 
new norms of gender equality that were supposed to prevail in all spheres 
of society. An important cultural and political push in the struggle for 
gender equality came from the Women’s Movement, which mobilised 
in Norway from the early 1970s as in the rest of the Western world, 
but also continued on from older and less radical women’s organisations. 
The Norwegian social scientist Helga Hernes has described the process 
as a result of ‘state feminism’, a combination of ‘feminism from below’ 
(the movements and organisations in civil society) and ‘feminism from 
above’ (the legislation facilitated by feminist bureaucrats and politicians) 
(Hernes 1987). What especially came to distinguish the Nordic ‘caring 
state’ from other Western countries was that care for children, disabled 
people and the elderly from early on was seen as a public responsibility 
and was given a universal form (Leira 2012). From the 1980s, wom-
en’s economic chances were supported by the implementation of gender 
quotas and other anti-discrimination legislation with regard to educa-
tion and work, and the expansion of parental leaves and public daycare 
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with regard to families. From the 1990s onwards, the political model 
of the universal breadwinner was extended to the idea of the universal 
carer (Fraser 1997). Men’s rights as fathers received increasing attention 
(Korsvik 2011), and a special and mandatory father’s quota of the paren-
tal leave was implemented in 1993.7 This has created a unique situation 
for Norwegian fathers when it comes to care, which today they only share 
with fathers in Sweden, Iceland and Germany. Quotas for men were also 
introduced in education and jobs related to care for and teaching of chil-
dren. All this indicates that the Nordic gender equality model not only 
led to ‘defamilisation’ with its emphasis on women’s economic indepen-
dence, but also entails elements of ‘refamilisation’ through generous sys-
tems of parental leave for both parents, paid absence from work to take 
care of sick children, and a special cash-for-care allowance introduced in 
19988 (Ellingsæter and Leira 2006; Ellingsæter 2012).
Norway represents an interesting case in the Nordic context because 
it demonstrates more clearly than the other countries the tension 
between gender differentiation and gender equality that goes back to the 
 beginning of the twentieth century. This can partly be explained by con-
flicts between different class fractions of women (Sainsbury 2001) and 
7 The quota earmarked four weeks of the by then 42-week-long parental leave for the father. Six 
weeks (plus three weeks before birth) were earmarked the mother, so 29 weeks were left to be 
decided by the parents themselves. The father quota was expanded after 1993, almost in parallel 
with the expansion of the total parental leave. In 2011 the father quota was 12 weeks (and the total 
parental leave 47 weeks). In 2013 the social democratic government decided to expand it to 14 
weeks, but the following year a new right-wing government reduced it to 10 weeks. Before the 
father quota was introduced in 1993, very few fathers took out any of the joint parental leave. After 
it was introduced, a very large majority of fathers took out their quota, but only a few took out 
more than their earmarked weeks. It is the fathers with the highest and the lowest income who take 
the shortest leave (Ellingsæter 2012).
8 This reform gave a cash-for-care allowance for families with children under the age of three who 
did not attend publicly subsidised daycare, which was by then still in demand. It was introduced 
by a centre-right government, headed by the Christian Democratic Party, and the declared aim was 
to give families the choice of deciding the best care for their children and to contribute to more 
equal state remittances for childcare regardless of the chosen form of care. The proposal was held in 
strictly gender-neutral terms, but the effect of the reform was gendered since almost no fathers took 
out the allowance. The number of women in paid work was not reduced by the cash-for-care 
reform (the allowance was small), but the increase stopped for a few years until more public daycare 
had become available. Working-class and immigrant families are overrepresented among those who 
use the cash-for-care benefit today. But as more of the non-immigrant mothers than the immigrant 
mothers combine the allowance with paid work, the reform has to an increasing degree been seen 
as a problem for the integration of immigrant women and their children (Ellingsæter 2012).
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partly by the stronger hold of religion in some regions of Norway and 
its continuing influence in politics (Korpi 2000; Melby et al. 2008). In 
1960 Norway was among the countries in the Western world with the 
lowest rates of women in paid work, and women’s entry into the labour 
market came a decade later than in the other Nordic countries. The devel-
opment of daycare also came very slowly, and even today the number of 
Norwegian women working part-time is higher than in the other Nordic 
countries (Kitterød and Rønsen 2012). On the basis of these observations, 
researchers have described Norway as a more family-oriented and mater-
nalist culture than the other Nordic countries (Knudsen and Wærness 
2001; Sainsbury 2001; Borchorst 2008). It is probably more accurate 
to say that political disagreements have contributed to a dualistic family 
model (Ellingsæter 2012). However, the Norwegian tension between dif-
ferent family models, in combination with the cross-political agreement 
to prioritise care, may also be seen as having facilitated the track towards 
a universal caregiver model which may potentially transgress the equal-
ity/difference dilemma (Fraser 1997). The long parental leave, the father 
quota and other generous schemes to improve the care for children can 
be seen as a recognition of the importance of parental care, including the 
fact that it does not have to be gender-differentiated.
The middle generation in our sample became parents in around 1970, 
so when the Women’s Movement and the other radical movements of 
the 1970s took off, they were already established with families of their 
own. They are just ahead of what has been called a change of gear in 
family formation in the mid-1970s where the practice of cohabitation 
increased and the age for marriage and the birth of the first child went 
up (Noack and Hovde 2012; Pedersen 2012). Some of the women in 
our sample participated in marches on March 8 and demonstrations 
in favour of free abortion, and read the journals from the Women’s 
Movement, and some of the men remember that their wives became 
radicalised. The impact of the Women’s Movement is also seen as a frame 
of reference in the interviews when our informants talk about quarrels 
of housework and of divorces.
The 1970s was the decade where Norwegian women entered the labour 
market in large numbers, and during the 1980s this also came to include 
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women with young children.9 During the childhood of our youngest 
generation—from 1972 to 1990—the percentage of married or cohabit-
ing women with children under 15 years of age in paid work increased 
from 43 per cent to 77 per cent10 (Kitterød and Rønsen 2012: 163). 
However, what also characterised this period was that the development 
of daycare was far from following the number of working mothers (Leira 
2002). Thus, the women of our middle generation belong to the specific 
cohorts of young mothers who took up paid work before the state provi-
sions to cater to this was developed: in 1970 the maternity leave was 12 
weeks and the daycare coverage was three per cent.11 In the same period 
(1970–1990) women on average reduced the time they spent on care and 
housework considerably more than men increased their contribution. 
The father’s participation in housework depends on how many hours the 
mother works and how high her income is (Kjeldstad and Lappegård 
2010; Brannen 2015).12 Private help in the house has until recently been 
9 In the UK mothers with small children entered the labour market a decade later, in the 1990s. In 
2000 full-time employment among women with children in the UK was still much lower than in 
the Scandinavian countries (Fagani 2007; Brannen et al. 2004). Nordic women have on average the 
highest labour force participation in Europe and also when part-time is taken into consideration 
(den Dulk and Doorne-Huiskes 2007).
10 During this period, however, half of the women worked part-time, and the differentiation 
between part-time/full-time followed levels of education: the longer the education, the more full-
time work (Skrede 1986; Kitterød and Rønsen 2012). In 2010 the number of mothers in paid work 
had increased to 87 per cent. The numbers also include women on parental leave, and as the leave 
was considerably prolonged in the same period of time (from 12 weeks in 1970 to 28 weeks in 
1990, and to 46 weeks in 2010), the numbers are not directly comparable (Kitterød and Rønsen 
2012; Ellingsæter 2012).
11 In 1990 the daycare coverage had increased to 35 per cent, which was still far behind the number 
of working mothers with young children. In particular, the coverage for children under three years 
was a problem until the beginning of the 2000s. The coverage in Oslo was much higher than the 
average in the entire country (Myhre 1994). There was also a social differentiation as middle-class 
children more often attended public daycare than children from working-class families (Ellingsæter 
2012). Only in 2009 did public daycare become a right for children from the age of 12 months. 
The public daycare coverage in the Nordic countries is much higher and much cheaper than in 
most other European countries. For instance, in 2005, childcare costs represented 12 per cent of a 
family’s net income in Norway and 27 per cent in the UK (den Dulk and Doorne-Huiskes 2007).
12 In 1971 (the year our youngest generation was born) women spent 29 hours a week on average 
on housework, while men spent four hours (maintenance work, care work and shopping not 
included). In 1990 (the time we conducted our interviews) for number of hours for women had 
reduced to 16, while for men it increased to five hours. In 2010 (when we did the last interviews 
with the youngest generation) for number of hours for women had reduced to 12 hours, while for 
men it increased to seven hours. In the same timeframe, men doubled the time spent on care, 
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very rare in Norway outside of high-status families and was at the time 
when we did our interviews associated more with household income than 
with employment of the woman in the family (Kitterød 2009).
It has been argued that the Nordic gender equality policies have been 
more attuned to the life form of families where both parents have full-
time and attractive jobs and where the women can benefit from schemes 
to promote women’s careers in work and politics. Support of gender 
equality both in attitude and practice are related to education and job 
status, especially for women (Crompton et  al. 2007; Kjeldstad and 
Lappegård 2010). This tendency is also reflected in the middle genera-
tion in our sample, where most of the middle-class women had full-time 
jobs, or close to full- time, and most had stayed home only during periods 
of parental leave, whereas some of the working-class women worked part-
time and had stayed at home for some years when their children were 
small. Working- class women and women from certain ethnic groups 
tend to be sceptical of middle-class women’s career orientation and prefer 
to spend more time with their family, and some may also prefer more 
distinct gender roles in the home and regarding childcare. However, the 
majority of them support the idea of gender equality and especially politi-
cal measures for equal pay and statutory rights against sexualised violence 
(Walby 1997; Skilbrei 2005; Melby et al. 2008; Andersen and Aarseth 
2012). Discrepancies between attitudes to gender equality and the prac-
tised gender equality, especially with regard to housework, are also within 
all social groups, but in different forms. Generally, for women practice 
is less equal than their attitudes to gender equality, whereas for men it is 
the other way round (Kjeldstad and Lappegård 2010). It is also the case 
for all groups that structural forces may increase the dissonance between 
attitudes and practices: in working-class and immigrant families, who in 
general are more in favour of a traditional division of work, economic 
and practical conditions often make their actual practices more gender-
equal. In middle- class families, especially those where the husband has 
a high salary, structural conditions make it possible for the women to 
whereas the hours were the same for women (Kitterød and Rønsen 2012). Still, Nordic families 
share the domestic work more equally than is the case in other European countries (den Dulk and 
Doorne-Huiskes 2007).
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work less. Thus, somewhat paradoxically, a positive attitude to gender 
equality may still be drawn towards a more gender-traditional practice. A 
contributing factor here is also the increasing demand of long work hours 
in high- status professional jobs, especially in the private sector (Andersen 
and Aarseth 2012; Kavli 2012; Brannen 2015). This picture is reflected 
by the fact that the men who use the father quota the least are those with 
either very high or very low incomes (Ellingsæter 2012).
Gender equality as a norm and value has a high degree of support across 
the Norwegian population. Today 70 per cent of the Norwegian popula-
tion has a positive attitude to the family model where both breadwinning 
and domestic work are shared between the spouses (NOU  15  2012). 
However, there is also a rising critique of the pressured lives of families 
with small children and double careers, and younger people have voiced 
their opinions about more freedom of choice and individual solutions 
(Melby et al. 2008; Andersen and Aarseth 2012). Still, the political dis-
cussions of gender equality are mainly limited to questions like ‘how far’ 
gender equality should go, to what degree it should also focus on men’s 
situations or include other dimensions of discrimination, and to what 
degree gender equality in the family and in private enterprises should be 
a private choice or a target of state intervention. Arguments for a return 
to the old gender contract with distinct roles for women and men or even 
to the housewife model of the 1950s are rarely seen outside the contexts 
of extreme political or religious groups.13
 Youth, Gender and Modernity
A last contextual framing important to the study is the way the period of 
youth and sexual norms changed during the twentieth century. Especially 
in the post-war years the educational policy encouraged individuality in 
girls from early on, both in the family and in school, and the earlier pro-
13 In recent years, the changing gender contract has provoked some very negative and even violent 
reactions in Europe and the USA among people belonging to the extreme political right or religious 
groups who see modernisation as a threat to ‘God-given’ values. One of the worst incidents took 
place in Norway in 2011, where a right-wing terrorist killed 69 people and legitimised it as a war 
against modern gender relations and Muslim immigration.
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vision of sex education in schools may also have been significant. The 
social processes that had an impact on the family in the twentieth century 
had far-reaching effects on what it meant to be a young person: indi-
vidualisation, increasing affluence, extended education, social and geo-
graphical mobility and increased consumption. Modernisation processes 
gradually led to a demarcation of youth as a separate life phase all over 
the Western world, and the need for what Erik H. Erikson has coined 
a psychosocial moratorium (Erikson 1968: 156). Increased reflexivity, 
choice and reorientation become urgent issues when new generations 
cannot simply take over their parents’ way of life, but have to find their 
own way. For many it involved a prolonged period of education and/or 
increased geographical mobility. The concept of moratorium has been 
criticised for generalising the life trajectory of middle-class youth. A rela-
tively free and experimental period of life between childhood and adult 
life was indeed first a privilege of young men from the bourgeoisie, and 
later to some degree also the young women from the middle classes who 
got higher education. However, as we have seen earlier, the agrarian fam-
ily model of north-western European often allowed for a period free of 
parents’ control between childhood and marriage. To call it a moratorium 
would stretch the concept too far, both because it was a period of hard 
work, little pay and being under the authority of the new household, and 
because the young person after this period of work often returned to his 
or her local community and largely continued the way of life of his or her 
parents’ generation. However, with industrialisation and urbanisation, 
more young people from rural areas and the working class took up work 
in the cities as industrial workers, apprentices, office workers or maids. 
This meant both more formally regulated work hours than working in 
a rural household had done, and gradually also better pay, which gave a 
historically new possibility for young people to spend money. Freedom, 
consumption and leisure became closely intertwined, especially for young 
working- class girls (Thorsen 1993a, b; Drotner 1999): theirs was a strong 
urge ‘to become modern’ (Søland 2000; Ekerwald 2002). While girls 
from rural areas found themselves more confined by family obligations 
and middle-class girls of the cities experienced more control by their par-
ents, including demands in relation to education, working-class girls in 
the big cities who were often outside the reach of their parents’ control 
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got access to free time and a little money of their own (Thorsen 1993a, b). 
One of our informants in the oldest generation illustrates this. Borghild, 
born into a rural working-class family in 1911, remembers having a long 
row with her parents before she was finally allowed to take up a post as a 
housemaid for a well-off family in Oslo in 1928. The first thing she did 
when she was out of the sight of her mother was to cut off her braids and 
get a perm. She received a relatively good salary and this allowed her to 
buy make-up and fashionable clothes. A series of retouched portraits show 
her and a girlfriend in Oslo in the late 1920s with wavy hair, fur collars, 
pearl necklaces and ‘diva gazes’. Since she was in the lucky situation that 
she did not have to send money back home to her family, she could also 
invest in things for her future, for instance, a full dinner set that cost her 
half a month’s salary. When we interviewed her more than half a century 
later, the dinner set still sparkled in the vitrine cabinet in her rural home.
To relax, to enjoy yourself, to have fun has constituted the central 
agenda of the twentieth century’s emerging youth cultures. The ris-
ing standards of living made an increasing number of young people 
reach for more than the thrift and toil of their parents’ lives, and it also 
opened up new horizons of individual freedom from family demands 
and moral obligations. This profound change in moral orientation in 
modern society was closely intertwined with the rise of mass culture and 
consumption. In the 1920s and 1930s youthful fun became connected 
to fashion, music, films, smoking, drinking, dating and romance—all 
of which required money, material goods and special arenas for young 
people, and made the older generation panic (Frykmann 1988; Modell 
1989; Wennhall 1994; Drotner 1999; Søland 2000; Illouz 2007). Photos 
of Norwegian high- school classes from the first decade of the twentieth 
century show young women in long dresses and topknots, whereas in 
school photos only two decades later, all the female students had short 
hair and fashionable clothes (Krohg 1996). Modern technologies like 
radio, phonographs, film and magazines led to the breakthrough of an 
international youth style in the 1920s. The impact was strongest in the 
cities, even if young women from our sample who grew up in remote 
rural areas in Norway also followed the new times closely through radio, 
touring films and  fashion journals. In the 1930s and 1940s youth cul-
ture became more separated from the adult world. With the arrival of 
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jazz, swing and hot, young people started to pursue their own taste in 
music and ways of dancing, and young female bodies were now exposed 
in shorts and two-piece bathing suits. The ‘swingpjatters’ from the early 
1940s released a regular moral panic among adults in the Scandinavian 
countries when they danced to swing, jazz and foxtrot in their shocking 
outfits (Frykmann 1988; Wennhall 1994). The arrival of the sound film 
in the early 1930s led to an indulging in film stars and glamour. The 
romantic melodrama became the grand genre of popular culture of the 
inter-war period, especially addressing young women. The Danish youth 
and media researcher Kirsten Drotner (1999) argues that the mixture of 
moral dilemmas and emotional intensities especially appealed to young 
women as it could be understood as a symbolic staging of the increasing 
tension between autonomy and dependency that young women felt cul-
turally and psychologically at this time.
Mediasation, commercialisation and generational protest increased in 
the youth cultures of the post-war period, represented by the middle gen-
eration in our sample. Music and clothes styles for young people were 
now separated out in marketing and sales (Cook and Kaiser 2004) based 
on the rapidly increasing levels of consumption. The ‘teenager’ was con-
ceived by the marketing sector in the US in the 1940s and was used 
for the first time in print in Norway in 1951. ‘Must-have’ fashion items 
and wonders like one’s own private transistor radio or battery-operated 
record player became epidemics in this generation of baby boomers in 
the 1950s and 1960s. Young people now identified as a special age group 
through the youth cultural sign systems, including the new youth maga-
zines that became available at this time featuring youth fashion, beauty 
tips, music and film material. Rock and beat music became the cultural 
hallmark of this generation. An intense cultivation of music bands, film 
actors and idols takes over for the romantic melodrama of the inter-war 
years (Bjurström 1980). The idea that you can change your own per-
sonality through a new style is introduced (Johnson 1993). A girl in our 
middle generation, born in 1948, moved for two years to another city 
with her family. She still recalls her dream of how she, on her return, 
would have changed personality to become an outgoing and popular girl 
in new smart outfits and how this would change her position among her 
peers. In the late 1960s and 1970s the generational protest assumed more 
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political forms, including a critical stand towards commercialisation and 
fashion. Long hair, hippie style and jeans took over from high heels and 
teased hairdos. None of our informants were directly active in political 
movements, but those who received higher education remember it as a 
period where they developed more radical political views and partici-
pated in demonstrations.
Around 1990, the youth period of the youngest generation in our 
sample, fashionable clothes had become brand-label clothing, and the 
youth style and music had become more differentiated and divided 
into a plethora of subcultures that signalled not only youth, but also 
what kind of youth (Bjurström 1997; Lynne 2000). Modern cafés had 
reached Oslo and were frequented by our middle-class informants, 
whereas our working-class informants preferred to meet at discos. The 
VCR and CD player had arrived, and this generation spent much time 
watching films and TV series together (Drotner 1991). Issues of confor-
mity and uniqueness were at stake in new ways. To follow mainstream 
fashion or fads uncritically or to not be choosy in music was, at least 
for middle-class youth, a sign of immaturity (Christensen 1994; Jensen 
2001). One of our informants, for instance, said the following about 
binge drinking parties: ‘Okay, fine, but you’re over it by the time you get 
to high school, like [laughs], at least I was … You’re supposed to have, to 
show that you’re in control, because that is simply a teenybopper thing.’ 
Everybody should be in control and ‘be themselves’, but the ubiquitous 
commercial youth cultural sign systems seemed to overtake even the 
most original. Counter cultures like Punk, Goth, Hip Hop and Rave are 
associated with the 1980s and 1990s (Bjurström 1997), but except for 
the music, few of our informants identified strongly with these youth 
cultures. We do not find anything like the generational protest and stu-
dent revolt of the 1970s in this generation, but many young people, 
especially young women, became engaged in political activism relating 
to environment protection, anti-racist work, EU-protest and squatting 
(Christensen 1994). Compared to our two older generations as young 
people, the political engagement is actually much more pronounced in 
our youngest generation.
Of special interest in the context of this book are the ways these youth 
cultures contributed to changing the meaning of gender and sexuality. 
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The twentieth century saw huge changes in sexual morals and conduct 
(Segal 1994; Brumberg 1997; Jamieson 1998). The sexual revolution 
entailed sexual debuts at a younger age for both women and men, start-
ing in the 1950s, and from 1970 women began having sex at a younger 
age than men (Pedersen 2005). Sex education for young people was grad-
ually introduced in the second half of the century (de Coninck- Smith 
2003) and gay and lesbian rights became a political issue (Plummer 
1995; Kristiansen 2008). From the 1980s there was a marked increase in 
the commercial sexualisation of public space and also easier access to por-
nography through new media (Sørensen 2002; Knudsen and Sørensen 
2006). A focus on HIV/AIDS, rape, sexual violence and harassment is 
characteristic of the period when we did our interviews (Plummer 1995). 
Young people, especially young women, are often seen as victims of this 
increasing sexualisation (Brumberg 1997; Wolf 1997). However, seen 
from a generational perspective, they have also been agents in the forma-
tion of more liberal sexual norms. Whereas adult women in various his-
torical periods have challenged gender structures in work, the economy 
and politics, young women have rather worked ‘through’ gender (Nielsen 
2004). By gradually changing the norms for how gender, the body and 
sexuality can be represented, by reframing sexuality and morality in pub-
lic spaces as well as privately, young women across these three generations 
have simultaneously carved out spaces for female agency in relation to 
the body and sexuality. Young men have to a lesser degree been seen as 
either social agents or loci of changing sexual mores. Ken Corbett (2009) 
claims that the understanding of men’s bodies and desires has not been 
seen as refigured or reconceptualised like women’s bodies and desire have 
been, but rather have been hampered by traditional Freudian formula-
tions. Corbett finds that men’s bodies and desire ‘are as disavowed as once 
women’s bodies were’ before the advent of feminism (2009: 218). Willy 
Pedersen (2005) also argues that whereas young women’s sexual activities 
are seen as modern and progressive today, young men’s sexual activities 
are seen as old-fashioned and reactionary, even when women and men 
engage in the same kind of sexual activities (for instance, watching por-
nography or purchasing sex toys). Our interviews will illuminate some 
of the changes that have also taken place in men’s bodies and desires, but 
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when it comes to contextual framing, the available sources offer the story 
seen from the perspective of the young women.
The shift in normative ideals that the young girls in these three gen-
erations identify can be described as a move from the ‘nice girl’ of the 
inter-war period to the ‘popular girl’ of the post-war period and to the 
‘autonomous girl’ by the end of the century (Nielsen 2004; Nielsen and 
Rudberg 2007). The Danish-American historian Birgitte Søland has in a 
study of young Danish women in the 1920s (Søland 2000) observed that 
the concept of ‘nice girls’ appears exactly at the historical moment in the 
1920s when young girls started to go out on their own with their friends, 
something that made them vulnerable to sexual assaults and bad reputa-
tions. Public space in the city was an especially ambiguous territory, a 
zone of individual freedom without the family bonds that were still intact 
in the countryside. Søland describes a battle from bastion to bastion 
with regard to young women’s bodies: short dresses, short hair, sleeveless 
tops, bathing suits and so on—everything modern was associated with 
being cheap. One critique of the time was that the girls’ presence in the 
public space blurred the lines between respectable and non-respectable 
women. In this normative vacuum, Søland says, it was felt as necessary to 
construct a dividing line between ‘nice’ and ‘cheap’ girls. By identifying 
themselves as nice girls, only out to have some fun, the young women 
could defend their right to be in a public space without losing their rep-
utation. Female friends gained importance both as ‘partners in crime’ 
and as providing a space to discuss what the limits should be in relation 
to behaviour and self-presentation. The changing limits for respectable 
femininity are also seen in the new ideal of the young woman at this time: 
the lively and energetic girl with an appealing mixture of sweetness and 
charm replaced the shy and modest Victorian girl (Thorsen 1997; Telste 
2002). The line between nice and cheap girls was indeed sharp and dan-
gerous in the inter-war period. In particular, young working-class women 
were at risk of being coded as the sexual and deviant ‘other’ against which 
nice femininity was defined (see also Skeggs 1997).
The ‘nice girl’ disappeared during the war. The sight of young girls on 
their own in public space no longer shocked or provoked; thus, young 
women had gained more freedom and did not have to legitimise their pres-
ence by being nice. The nice girl had by now rather become a  boring girl, 
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but the ‘cheap girl’ was still around. This presented the young women in 
this generation with the difficulty of avoiding the stigma as ‘cheap’, while 
still having no clear-cut guidelines for what a girl was actually allowed 
to do. The American sociologist Winnie Breines (1992) writes about the 
contradiction in the USA in the 1950s and early 1960s between a rising 
glorification and commercialisation of sex in the public space conveyed 
by ads, music and movies, and traditional sexual morals with its demand 
for virginity. Virginity was not so explicitly celebrated as an ideal in the 
Scandinavian context, but girls could easily be stigmatised as ‘cheap’ if 
they were together with more than one boy. Breines describes how the 
new freedom and individuality of the 1950s and 1960s also implied a 
new form of exposure for young women. They were more present in the 
public space and they were evaluated by other young people on the basis 
of their individual qualities. This is probably one reason why looks, social 
charms and popularity with the boys were so overwhelmingly impor-
tant for the young women of this generation, paradoxically enough at a 
time where they had more opportunities for education than ever before. 
Being popular and being clever in school often stood in irreconcilable 
opposition to each other in this generation (Breines 1992; Brumberg 
1997). Relationships among girls were extended from being the ‘partners 
in crime’ of the oldest generation to including a more brutal rivalry for 
boys and popularity, as the free market seldom allows for sentimentality. 
The disappearance of the ‘nice girls’ in this generation, especially under 
the influence of the sexual revolution from the late 1960s, the increased 
knowledge about sexuality and the arrival of the pill,14 may have encour-
aged more experimental behaviour in relation to drinking and smoking, 
as well as more provocative dressing and use of make-up, all causing a 
heightened level of conflict with parents. But the absence of a clear line 
between nice girls and cheap girls also meant that sexual morality was on 
its way to becoming a personal matter and responsibility, not just some-
thing to adapt to (Ravesloot et al. 1999).15 Thus, freedom in the public 
14 The pill came in 1967 but was not generally in use in Norway until the 1970s. Free abortion was 
implemented in 1978. Thus, the women of our middle generation could not take advantage of 
these new possibilities before they were married and had had children.
15 Ravesloot et al. (1999) conclude this from a study of courtship and sexuality of young people in 
the 1950s and 1990s from the Netherlands, where they find a change from prohibition morality to 
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space carved out by the inter-war generation under the banner of being 
nice girls was further elaborated by the post-war generation in a curious 
blend of increased individualised morality and responsibility on the one 
hand and a strengthening of the heterosexual script on the other.
If the nice girl had disappeared for the post-war generation, the con-
tour of the ‘cheap’ girl became blurry towards the end of the twentieth 
century. Young women were now allowed to experience both desire and 
ambition as gender-syntonic. Double standards for girls and boys are still 
at work, but the dominant view is now that it is a purely personal mat-
ter when and with whom to have sex—as long as one is cautious about 
using contraception (McRobbie and Garber 1975; Pedersen 2005). It 
is now rather the fear of not being self-reliant and independent enough 
that interferes with both friendships and sexual relations. The popular 
and boy-crazy girl now lingers on the edge of conformity, neither true to 
herself nor to her female friends. The danger is no longer that of being ‘a 
fallen women’, but rather of being ‘a fallen subject’ (Nielsen and Rudberg 
2007). The ideal of the ‘autonomous’ girl may be finishing off the ‘cheap’ 
girl, but in turn produces another anti-type: the weak and dependent 
girl who cannot stand up for herself. Such girls are no longer seen as 
‘cheap’, but rather as ‘exposed’, as girls vulnerable to sexual assaults. This 
discourse has become widespread in social and medical research on youth 
sexuality, where early sexual experiences have been consistently associ-
ated with poor resources and early general behaviour problems, espe-
cially among young girls. Thus, the class position of the ‘exposed’ girl is 
unchanged compared to the ‘cheap’ girl in the two oldest generations (see 
Pedersen et al. (2003) for a review). In all generations we find a specially 
designed category for young girls who have too much sex or sex in the 
wrong way, and this category has almost inextricably been connected to 
working- class girls.
For the middle-class girls in this generation, the gender-related prob-
lem is not so much sexuality as their bodies, which have now become the 
most ultimate expression of the self. The demands of exercise and health 
as well as the widespread panic regarding ‘epidemics of fat’ (Bordo 1999: 
situational ethics (Ravesloot et al. 1999). In our study we find the same direction of change, but 
taking place already in the middle generation (the 1960s) (see Chap. 8).
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69) had become a dominating cultural discourse when we interviewed the 
youngest generation as 18-year-olds. According to the North American 
historian Joan Brumberg (1997), this represents a historical trend in the 
last century, where society changed focus from inner qualities to outer 
looks, which in turn were ever-more commercialised and uniformly pre-
sented. The body appears to be a central battlefield between new subjec-
tivities and old gender discourses both outside and inside young women 
today. This tension was exactly the point of frustration that exploded 
in the Scandinavian countries in around 2000  in a number of debate 
books by young feminists of the same age as our youngest generation (for 
instance, Skugge et  al. 1999). The young middle-class women behind 
these books did not have any problems in making their voices heard, 
getting good marks and good jobs; the problem was that they were still 
caught in gender stereotypes, especially when it came to the body proj-
ect. As body and style have become the central points of modern self- 
construction, the young women seem to be caught in a dilemma: it is 
deeply offending to girls who see themselves as subjects to be reduced to 
body and gender. The books by the young feminists circled this topic: 
their problem was not that they were not pretty enough, but that they 
still cared about being pretty enough. Shame is connected to having failed 
as a self-contained individual. This context of shifting youth cultures, and 
especially the cultural meanings surrounding the young female body, is 
an important context in which to understand the feelings of gender that 
these three generations have experienced in connection to their own and 
other bodies in their youth.
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